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by Paul Kearns
The author considers the advent of cultural concerns in EU law in 
the light of the lack of an explicit EU cultural policy, and the 
problems that have subsequently arisen from the haphazard 
development of EU cultural law as a new legal category.
I t is unsurprising that culture did not arise as a primary concern when EU law was in its infancy since the EEC's eponymous concerns were purely economic. 
However, with the development of the EC, then EU, 
incorporating not just economic objectives as the remit, 
culture emerged as a growing ne\v area of Europeano o o 1
interest, notably post-Maastricht. Allied, more substantive 
initiatives were the foundation of EU citizenship and the 
increased EU development of human rights, both of which 
areas had legal precedents for the EU to follow within or 
outside the EU.
Cultural protection did not fit easily within the ambit of 
either of these related concerns and there was a 
conceptual difficulty as to in what established legal zone 
culture could be regulated. This need to fit culture under 
another umbrella was because there was originally no legal 
autonomy granted to cultural provisions in EU law. As a 
result, cultural aid, for example, thrived as a matter of 
state aid, whereas cultural rights were very slow in 
developing in the EU context because there was no 
comparable established route for their regulation even 
though certain human rights were protected as a matter of 
EU law. This fracturing of the cultural area was to beo
remedied at Maastricht, and current Cultural Title XII, 
originally conceived at Maastricht, promised a more 
pronounced independent role for culture within EU 
competence. The principal dramatic development was the 
coming into force of what is now Article 151, which is seto 7
out as follows:
' Article 151 (I) EC. The Community shall contribute to the 
Jlowering of the cultures of the Member States, while 
respecting their national and regional diversity and at the 
same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.
2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging co- 
operation between Member States and, if necessary, 
supporting and supplementing their action in the following 
areas:
- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture 
and history of the European peoples;
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European 
significance;
- non-commercial cultural exchanges;
- artistic and literary creation, including the audiovisual sector.
3. The Community and the Member States shall foster co- 
operation with third countries and the competent 
international organisations in the sphere of culture, in 
particular the Council of Europe.
4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its 
action under other provisions of this Treaty. [In particular in 
order to respect and to promote the diversities of its cultures.]
5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives 
referred to in this Article, the Council:
- acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
251 and after consulting the Committee of the Regions, shall 
adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the 
laws and regulations of the Member States. The Council shall 
act unanimously throughout the procedure referred to in Article 
251;
- acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall 
adopt recommendations.'
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OBSERVATIONS ON ARTICLE 151
There is a lot to observe about these provisions. In 
Article 151(1) there is the practical appeal to note that 
within the EU there are both common and individual 
cultural phenomena in the Member States. The 
homogeneity proposed is not a bland EU conformism but, 
rather, a complex holistic picture that has EU 
membership as a parameter. Article 151(2) indicates 
Community action in respect of the nature of cultural 
activities that are to be developed between Member States 
when they interact; the Article also anticipates 
Community action beyond these objectives but the 
specific character of such extra action seems to be 
restricted to the activities already given in the Article 
paragraph. Article 151(3) is an outward-looking provision 
that urges co-operation between the Community and 
Member States, presumably disjunctively and 
conjunctively, and third countries and apposite 
international entities. The Council of Europe is given 
special mention as one such body. This is not surprising 
because the Council of Europe is immersed in cultural 
concerns and is informally a sister supra national 
European organisation.
Article 151 (4) is difficult to interpret. It foresees the 
Community taking cultural issues into account when 
acting under other provisions of its treaty law; with the 
additional stress that such measures must respect and 
promote the whole range of its cultures. The subsidiarity- 
principle, by which decisions are to be taken at a national 
local level, will be highly significant in this context. Article 
151(5) is a principally procedural provision that involves 
in part consultation with the Committee of the Regions to 
achieve the substantive aim of incentive measures. Taken 
together, Articles 151(4) and 151(5) promote much 
cultural action at a domestic level in keeping with the 
subsidiarity principle and the nature of the work of the 
Committee of the Regions, which too has local issues as its 
primary concern. This dissolves irrational fears that the 
EU's programme of cultural law has EU undifferentiated 
cultural homogeneity as its objective.
CASE LAW
Whether Article 151 embodies a EU policy is a highly 
controversial subject as some maintain that a policy must 
be explicit not inferred. What is more, from case law, it is 
national policy that is more prominent in relation to 
culture, as a permitted vehicle for derogation from the EU 
principle of free movement. In Cinetheque v Federation 
National Des Cinemas Francais [1985] ECR 2605 it was said 
that cultural aims may justify certain restrictions on the 
free movement of goods provided that those restrictions 
apply to national and imported products without 
distinction, diat they are appropriate to the cultural aim 
which is being pursued and that they constitute the means 
of achieving them which affects intra-Community trade 
the least. From this case, it is evident that the protection
of at least motion visual art can be added to the Cassis De 
Dijon [1979] ECR 649 list of mandatory requirements 
which facilitate legitimate derogations from the free
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movement of goods principle.
Similarly, in Groener v Minister For Education [1989] ECR 
3967, in the context this time of the free movement of 
persons, it was adjudged that the EEC Treaty does not 
prohibit the adoption ot a policy for the protection and 
promotion of a language of a Member State that is both 
the national language and the first official language. The 
court said, however, that discrimination against nationals77 o
of other Member States in the course of the free 
movement of workers was prohibited, and that any 
disproportionate measure to the object pursued was 
unacceptable. In the context of the related area of free 
movement of services, it was pronounced that a national 
cultural policy might constitute an overriding requirement 
relating to the general interest, which justifies a restriction 
on the freedom to provide services. It was also held in this 
case that restrictions might be imposed in order to protect 
consumers against excessive advertising or, as an objective
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of cultural policy, in order to maintain a level of 
programme quality.
Again in the context of the provision of services, the 
European Court has held, in Commission v Italy [1991] ECR 
1-709, that the general interest in consumer protection 
and in the conservation of the national historic and artistic 
heritage can constitute an overriding reason justifying a 
restriction on the freedom to provide services. Variations 
on this approach emerged in two subsequent cases: first, 
in Commission v France [1991] ECR 1-659, where it was 
said, somewhat differently, that the general interest in the' 7' o
proper appreciation of places and things of 'historical 
interest' and the widest possible dissemination of 
knowledge of the artistic cultural heritage can alsoo o
underpin an overriding reason justifying a restriction on 
the freedom to provide services; and, second, in 
Commission v Greece [1991] ECR 1-727, where it was 
considered in broadly similar terms to those adopted in 
Commission v Italy, above, and Commission v France, above, 
and perhaps conflating the two, that the general interest in 
the proper appreciation of the artistic and archaeological 
cultural heritage of a country and in consumer protection 
can comprise an overriding reason justifying a restriction 
on the freedom to provide services.
From this stream of related case law, we discern a 
narrow focus on national cultural policy without an 
accompanying explicit reference to EU cultural policy, if 
one indeed exists. There is no obvious relation between 
Article 151 and any such policy. We are left, therefore, 
with a somewhat disjointed picture of EU cultural 
regulation. Only the EU Commission has addressed 
cultural policy directly, and that body treats it as a 
mediator for integration rather than on its own terms. 
This is perhaps explained by the proposition that the 
inclusion of culture in the Treaty on European Union was
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at the relevant time generally agreed to have been an 
implicit part of a more general strategy to more closely 
involve the citizens of Europe in the process of European 
integration.
SCOPE OF CULTURAL INITIATIVE
The scope of a specific cultural initiative in EU law can 
therefore be seen as very narrow. The text of Article 151, 
set out above, confines the competence in the audio-visual 
realm to artistic and literary creations, including in the 
audio-visual sector, rather than opening the whole of the 
audio-visual sector to Community intervention. 
Additionally, the Article's provision that the Council shall 
adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of 
the laws and regulations of the Member States, indicates 
the lack of availability of what can be termed hard law. 
This arguably results in the European Union being 
essentially confined to the establishment of financial 
incentives in the area of culture.
A further potentially limiting factor is that Council 
decisions in the cultural area are to be taken unanimously 
as opposed to by qualified majority voting. Another 
inhibiting factor is that although cultural rights haveo o o
gained importance within public international law in 
particular, they have not acquired the same status in 
European Union legal vocabulary and instruments, 
perhaps because they are normally viewed as group rights 
rather than individual rights; this is the case despite being 
cultural issues which fall within Community competence. 
Such difficulties for cultural development in the 
European Union are clearly problematic but they can,
nevertheless, be cast in relief by the following 
observations. Until Maastricht, there was clearly no 
policy for culture but, even within the strictly economic 
competences of the Community, matters of cultural 
concern periodically surfaced. This was most apparent 
when the derogation to the free movement of goods foro o
the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, 
historic or archaeological value was spasmodically 
invoked. Regulation 3911/92 on the export of cultural 
goods and Directive 93/7 on the return of cultural goods 
and objects exported illegally, though running in the 
opposite direction to the treasures derogation, also 
pointed up culture as a Community concern. In addition, 
it was introduced into the EC Treaty by the Treaty of 
European Union that state and to promote culture and 
heritage conservation may be compatible with the 
common market as long as the aid does not affect tradingo o
conditions and competition in the Union to an extent 
that is contrary to the common interest.
Such irregular positive cultural developments in EU 
law form a placebo for the more general tortuous culture 
problematic diat has accrued within it. European Union 
organs must combine to tackle culture in a less incidental 
way and address its growing importance as an 
autonomous concern within EU competence in 
accordance with the independent, if rather incomplete, 
profile of Article 151.®
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